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Abstract In their important work, Facing the Future (Oxford 2001), Nuel Belnap
and his collaborators, Michael Perloff and Ming Xu, say the following (p. 204): “We
agree with Kane (1996) that … the question whether a kind of freedom that requires
indeterminism can be made intelligible deserves … our most serious attention, and
indeed we intend that this book contribute to what Kane calls ‘the intelligibility
question.”’ I believe their book does contribute significantly to what I have called
“the Intelligibility Question” for free will (which as I understand it is the question of
how one might make intelligible a free will requiring indeterminism without reducing
such a free will to either mere chance or to mystery and how one might reconcile such
a free will with a modern scientific understanding of the cosmos and human beings).
The theory of agency and choice in branching time that Belnap has pioneered and
which is developed in detail in Facing the Future is just what is needed in my view as
a logical foundation for an intelligible account of a free will requiring indeterminism,
which is usually called libertarian free will. In the first two sections of this article,
I explain why I think this to be the case. But the logical framework which Belnap
et al. provide, though it is necessary for an intelligible account of an indeterminist or
libertarian free will, is nonetheless not sufficient for such an account. In the remaining
sections of the article (3–5), I then discuss what further conditions may be needed
to fully address “the Intelligibility Question” for free will and I show how I have
attempted to meet these further conditions in my own theory of free will, developed
over the past four decades.
R. Kane (B)
Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin, 2210 Speedway, Stop C3500,
Austin, TX 78712-1737, USA
e-mail: rkane@uts.cc.utexas.edu
T. Müller (ed.), Nuel Belnap on Indeterminism and Free Action, 159
Outstanding Contributions to Logic 2, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-01754-9_8,
© The Author(s) 2014
160 R. Kane
1 The Intelligibility Question: An Introductory Narrative
In their important work, Facing the Future (hereafter FF), Nuel Belnap and his col-
laborators, Michael Perloff and Ming Xu, say the following (p. 204): “We agree with
Kane (1996) that … the question whether a kind of freedom that requires indeter-
minism can be made intelligible deserves, instead of a superficial negative, our most
serious attention, and indeed we intend that this book contribute to what Kane calls
‘the intelligibility question.”’ I believe their book does contribute significantly to
what I have called “the Intelligibility Question” for free will. The theory of agency
and choice in branching time that Belnap has pioneered and which is developed in
the book in detail is just what is needed in my view as a logical foundation for an
intelligible account of a kind of free will that requires indeterminism, which is usually
called libertarian free will. The logical framework they provide, though necessary
for an intelligible account of such an indeterminist or libertarian free will, is however
not sufficient for such an account. And I want to discuss in this article what further
conditions may be needed to adequately address “the Intelligibility Question.”
First, I need to say more about what the Intelligibility Question is. Since ancient
times philosophers have doubted that one could make sense of a kind of free will that
would require indeterminism. Such a free will, it was commonly argued, must reduce
freedom of choice either to mere chance or to mystery. When agents face a free choice
we assume that different possible pathways (or histories in the language of FF) are
open to them; and which possible pathway or history becomes the actual one will
depend in part at least on the agents themselves and how they choose. But if a free
choice is undetermined then it would appear that which historical future becomes the
actual one would be a matter of chance and so not within the control of the agent. An
undetermined event, it is often argued, occurs spontaneously and is not controlled
by anything, hence not controlled by the agent. If, for example, a choice occurred by
virtue of a quantum jump or other undetermined events in an agent’s brain it would
seem a fluke or accident rather than a responsible choice. Thus it is often argued
that indeterminism would not enhance our freedom, but would rather undermine it.
For reasons such as these and many others, thinkers have argued for centuries that
undetermined free choices would be “arbitrary,” “capricious,” “random,” “irrational,”
“uncontrolled,” “mere matters of luck or chance,” and not really free and responsible
choices at all. The Epicurean philosophers of old argued that there would be no room
in nature for free will if the atoms did not sometimes “swerve” in undetermined ways.
But the many ancient critics of their view, including Stoics and skeptics, scoffed at
such an idea, arguing that the mere chance swerve of atoms could not amount to
freedom of choice.
Defenders of an indeterminist or libertarian free will have had a poor record through
the centuries of answering these familiar charges. Realizing that free will could
not merely be indeterminism or chance, they have appealed to various obscure or
mysterious forms of agency or causation to make up the difference. Immanuel Kant
argued that we cannot explain free will in scientific terms, even though we require
it for belief in morality. To make sense of it we have to appeal to the agency of
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what he called a “noumenal self” outside space and time that could not be studied
in scientific terms. Many other philosophers from Descartes onward have believed
that only an appeal to a substance dualism of mind and body could make sense of
free will. Science might tell us there was some indeterminacy in nature or a place
for causal gaps in the brain, but a nonmaterial self would have to fill those causal
gaps in the physical world by intervening in the natural order. Nobel physiologist,
John Eccles, in the twentieth century, for example, argued that there might be some
place for indeterminism in synaptic transmission of neural impulses in the brain
(Eccles 1994). But he went on to argue that if we were to make sense of free choice
we would have to appeal in dualist fashion to a “transempirical power center” that
would intervene in the brain to fill the causal gaps thus left by the indeterminism. And
many other philosophers have referred to yet other libertarian strategems to account
for free will, such as uncaused causes, prime movers unmoved and special kinds of
agent or immanent causation that cannot be explained in terms of ordinary modes of
causation in terms of events familiar to the sciences.
In summary, the charge down through the centuries has been that a free will
requiring indeterminism was unintelligible or incoherent or impossible. Libertarian
views of free will must either reduce free will to mere chance or require some
appeal to mysterious forms of agency or causation that had no place in the modern
scientific picture of the world. As Nietzsche (2002, Sect. 8) summed up the matter
in his inimitable prose, freedom of the will in the “superlative metaphysical sense”
(as he put it), which requires that free agent somehow be a causa sui, is “the best
self-contradiction that has been conceived so far” by the mind of man.
The “Intelligibility Question” as I formulated it was a response to this long history
of debate and may be stated in this way: Can one make sense of, or give an intelligible
account of, a free will requiring indeterminism without reducing it to either mere
chance, on the one hand, or mystery, on the other?
To explain how I have attempted to answer this question in my own work, a bit
of history will be helpful. When I first began thinking about the free will problem in
the 1960s, the landscape of the free will debate was much simpler than today. The
unstated assumption was that if you had scientific leanings, you would naturally be a
compatibilist about free will, believing it to be compatible with determinism, unless
you denied it all together as did skeptics and hard determinists. And if on the other
hand you were a libertarian about free will, believing in a free will that was incom-
patible with determinism, it was assumed that you must invariably appeal to some
kind of obscure forms of agency to make sense of it—to uncaused causes, imma-
terial minds, noumenal selves, prime movers unmoved, or other examples of what
P. F. Strawson called the “panicky metaphysics” of libertarianism in his important
1962 essay, “Freedom and Resentment.”
If I may add a personal note here, I was a graduate student at Yale University
when Strawson’s essay first appeared in 1962 and it was there that I first knew Nuel
Belnap. He was one of my logic teachers at the time, along with Alan Anderson and
Fred Fitch. (Rich Thomason, an important contributor to the branching time logic
presupposed in FF, was a fellow graduate student at Yale at the time.) Belnap was
not working on the logic of agency and choice in branching time at that point to my
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knowledge. That was to come later. As I recall, Belnap was working with Anderson
at the time developing a new theory of “relevance logic,” another area in which he
has made significant contributions.
My own dissertation director and philosophical mentor at this time at Yale was
Wilfred Sellars, who soon after was to move to the University of Pittsburgh, along
with Belnap and Anderson. Sellars was a compatibilist about free will, like the vast
majority of scientists and philosophers of that era, and he did not believe that a lib-
ertarian free will requiring indeterminism could be accounted for without appealing
to obscure forms of agency of the kinds Strawson had called “panicky metaphysics.”
Appealing to an influential distinction that Sellars had himself introduced into con-
temporary philosophical discourse, he granted that free will in some sense was an
integral part of what he called the manifest image of humans and their world. But
he did not believe that a traditional indeterminist or libertarian free will could be
reconciled with what he called the scientific image of the world; and he challenged
me to show otherwise. With the naïveté characteristic of a young graduate student,
I suggested that I would return in a few weeks with an answer to this challenge. It
has turned out to be a project of somewhat longer duration, still ongoing.
It was a surprise therefore some 40 years later when I received in the mail a
complementary copy of Facing the Future, sent to me by Nuel Belnap. It was not
sent to me as a former student, but rather as someone who had in the intervening
years written extensively on the free will problem, attempting to make sense of the
libertarian free will, who might find the book congenial and a significant contribution
to that project. (He had in fact forgotten I had ever been a student of his so many
years ago and I had to remind him of the fact.) That our intellectual paths should
cross this way after so many years was indeed fortuitous. For, as noted above, I
do believe that FF provides a logical framework that is congenial to the project of
making sense of a free will requiring indeterminism and hence to addressing the
Intelligibility Question.
2 Action, Indeterminism, and Facing the Future
I will first give some reasons for thinking this is the case regarding the logical
framework of FF before turning to further issues that have to be addressed in order
to fully answer the Intelligibility Question. First, there are a number of issues and
topics in the philosophy of action related to free will that are made more precise by the
stit logic developed in FF, which philosophers who deal with action theory (usually
only in informal ways) would do well to take note of. The distinction between the
achievement stit and the deliberative stit (pp. 32–40) is particularly important in my
view for discussing issues about free will. The achievement stit involves an earlier
moment of choice or action that guarantees the later outcome A of an action. The
deliberative stit, by contrast, is evaluated at the moment of choice itself, the very
moment at which the agent sees to it that the outcome A will occur. The outcome A
is guaranteed by the present choice at the moment of choice itself. Both achievement
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stits and deliberative stits would play a role I believe in an adequate account of free
will. But the idea behind the achievement stit must also be expanded in a certain
way to account for free will as I understand it. As I will argue, acts done “of one’s
own free will,” it must be allowed, can also be achievements of multiple choices
and actions performed at earlier times which causally influence, even if they do not
always guarantee, later choices or actions.
Second, the notion of “settled” truth (pp. 29–32) which is basic to the framework of
FF is fundamental to making sense of libertarian free will and indeed to understanding
the traditional problem of free will itself. The operative intuition is that when an agent
faces a free choice (in particular, a deliberative stit), which choice will be made is
not settled true at any time before the choice itself is made. Doctrines of determinism
have been thought to be a threat to free will to the extent that they imply that for
every choice or action, whether or not it will occur is settled true at some time before
it does occur or not. Determinism can be and has been defined in many different
ways. But it is this implication of doctrines of determinism in terms of settled truth
that has historically been thought to be a threat to free will. The logical framework
of FF allows one to express this threat in a clear way.
Third, the framework of FF also helps to resolve a host of controversial issues
that have long been discussed in the literature of free will regarding the truth value
of future tensed sentences concerning human choices and actions. Since Aristotle, a
common assumption has been that if free choices and actions are neither fated nor
determined, then future tensed sentences concerning them must be neither true nor
false. But this assumption has led to numerous puzzles that are perceptively described
and many of which in my view are helpfully resolved in FF (pp. 144–176). To treat
future tensed sentences of these kinds as open sentences lacking the assignment of
a history parameter seems to me the right way to go to resolve these puzzles. To say
that a future tensed sentence concerning a free choice is neither true nor false is not
to say that it has some third truth value or a third special status. Given a model and
a context, an open sentence about an indeterminate future of this kind will have a
truth value, once a suitable value is applied for each of the parameters, including
the history parameter. This solution to the assertion problem for such future tensed
propositions seems to me quite congenial to libertarian accounts for free will, as is
the related solution in FF to the problem of “the thin red line” (pp. 160–174). The
solutions of the book to these problems can of course be questioned and its solution
to the problem of the thin red line is questioned by other contributors to this volume.
I am inclined to agree with its solution to the problem of the thin red line, but will not
argue the matter here. I will merely register the general conviction that something
like the solutions to these problems about future tensed propositions proposed in FF
is what is needed for a coherent conception of free will that requires indeterminism.
Fourth, the logical framework of FF helps to clarify a number of other issues in
the philosophy of action and in debates about free will and responsibility. These
include its perceptive account of the distinction between “refraining” from an action
and simply not performing the action, a distinction which philosophers of mind and
action have often puzzled over (pp. 40–45). The interpretation of the distinction in
terms of the logic of stit helps one to clearly see how refraining from an action can
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be a kind of action even though it also involves not performing an action. Another
area where the framework of FF is helpful is in spelling out the different possible
meanings of the much discussed expression “could have done otherwise” in the free
will literature (pp. 255–270). Belnap at al. show how certain puzzles in the literature
concerning the relation of moral responsibility to the ability to do otherwise can be
illuminated by distinguishing these different meanings of the ability to do otherwise.
Their framework also helps to clarify and formalize the important distinction between
so-called “soft facts” and “hard facts” about the past, a distinction that plays a role
in many debates about free will and determinism, but is not always carefully defined
(pp. 145–174). In these ways and in others, philosophers who deal with the theory
of action and free will in more informal ways have much to learn from the formal
framework developed by Belnap at al. in this book.
3 From Action to Free Will
While the framework of FF makes a significant contribution to debates about free
will in these and other ways, there is at least one point on which I would depart
from it—or perhaps better, qualify it to some degree—in giving an account of free
will. FF assumes that indeterminism and the logic of branching time presupposed
by it are required to account for action in general of any kinds, whereas on my view,
while indeterminism and branching time are required to explain free will (or more
precisely, actions done “of one’s own free will”), they are not required to account
for action in general. I would find it congenial, to be sure, if it could be shown that
all action and agency did require indeterminism, for then, a fortiori, acts of free will
would as well. But I am not convinced of this stronger claim and would need to be
shown otherwise, for the following reasons.
There seems to be a primordial sense of action and agency that is admittedly
presupposed by free will, but leaves open the question of whether determinism or
indeterminism is true. According to this primordial sense, to act is to guide behavior
toward a goal or purpose in accordance with a plan and it involves the capacity
to readjust both goal and plan (ends and means, one might also say) in the light
of feedback from the environment. Action in this primordial sense involves a cer-
tain kind of control of an agent over behavior that we might refer to as teleological
guidance control, given that the behavior in question is goal-directed and involves
guidance. Action in this sense of goal-directed, guided behavior is something other
living things are capable of, not merely human beings, though humans have further
and more sophisticated higher-order capacities to evaluate and re-evaluate both ends
and means. I believe action in this primordial sense can exist in principle in deter-
mined worlds. One reason for believing so is that the ability to guide behavior toward
a goal does not of itself imply that the agent also has the ability to do otherwise, i. e.,
to guide behavior to a different goal. Though, importantly, action in this primordial
sense is also compatible with some measure of indeterminism. So acknowledging it
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as a significant form of action does not settle issues about determinism and indeter-
minism.
It is when we ask further questions about this primordial conception of action,
in my view, that we raise distinctive issues about the freedom of the will. A central
question for example is this: Whence comes the purposes and plans themselves that
guide behavior, rendering it action in this primordial sense? Do the purposes and
plans (ends and means) that guide behavior have their sources or originate in the
agents themselves who act, or do these purposes and plans ultimately come entirely
from sufficient causes outside the agent and over which the agent does not have
control? This is a variant of the free will question; and one can see from it why
determinism has been thought by many historically to be a threat to free will. If
determinism were true there would be sufficient causes outside the agents and over
which the agents did not have control for whatever purposes and plans, ends and
means, agents might pursue—sufficient causes going back into the remote past for
why they had the purposes and plans they did have rather than some others. Agents
might still have the power to control behavior in accordance with their purposes and
plans (i.e. to act in the primordial sense), but they would not be the ultimate sources
of the purposes and plans that guide their behavior. That is, they might be able to do
what they willed, but they would not be the ultimate creators of what it is that they
willed, and in that sense would not be acting “of their own free will” in the sense of
“a will of their own free-making.”
Yet this notion of freedom of the will as ultimate creation of purposes (“a will
of one’s own free-making”) is itself highly problematic. It immediately conjures up
Nietzsche’s image, mentioned earlier, of an agent who exercises free will as some
kind of ultimate cause of itself, a causa sui, the “best self-contradiction conceived
so far by the mind of man.” The idea of a will of one’s own free-making suggests a
troubling backtracking regress, since to be the ultimate creator of one’s own present
will and purposes, one would have to be so by virtue of prior choices and actions
which would be motivated by still earlier purposes and plans, which earlier purposes
and plans in turn could not have sufficient causes outside the agent and over which
the agent did not have control, and so must be created by still earlier choices or
actions of the agent, and so on indefinitely.
This regress could be stopped, to be sure, if some choices or actions in the agent’s
life history did not have sufficient causes at all and so were undetermined. But, while
this solution points in the right direction (showing why indeterminism is thought to
be important for freedom of will), it brings us back to the dilemma that has histor-
ically given rise to the Intelligibility Question: If choices by which we (ultimately)
create our purposes and plans were undetermined, it seems that they would not be
in our control, since undetermined events occur by chance and are not controlled
by anything, hence not by agents. The alternative, as noted, would be to appeal to
mysterious forms of agency, to uncaused causes, prime movers, and the like; and in
such manner the appeal to ultimate creation of purposes leads us back to the dilemma
of chance or mystery once again.
To complicate matters, there is a further problem about indeterminism with regard
to free will that is also important for dealing with the Intelligibility Question. Unlike
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the previous dilemma, it is a problem that often gets overlooked in historical and
contemporary discussions about free will, though as I have argued for several decades,
it is crucial for understanding the very notion of the freedom of the will (see, e.g.,
Kane 1985, 1996, 2002b, 2007).
This problem is that even if one grants that indeterminism is a necessary condition
for genuinely free choices and actions, it turns out that it is not a sufficient condition
for freedom of will. The reason is that when we wonder about whether the wills
of agents are free, it is not merely whether they could have done otherwise that
concerns us, even if the doing otherwise is undetermined. What interests us is whether
they could have done otherwise voluntarily, intentionally, and rationally, rather than
merely by accident or mistake, unintentionally, inadvertently, or irrationally. Or,
putting it more generally, we are interested in whether agents could have acted
voluntarily (in accordance with their wills), intentionally (on purpose rather than
accidentally or inadvertently), and rationally (with good reasons) in more than one
way rather than in only one way, and in other ways merely by accident or mistake,
unintentionally, inadvertently, or irrationally.
I call such conditions–of more-than-one-way voluntariness, intentionality and
rationality–“plurality conditions” for free will (Kane 1996, 107–111). And I call
the ability to choose or act in more than one way voluntarily, intentionally and ratio-
nally, i.e. in accordance with these conditions, plural voluntary control (PVC). These
plurality conditions seem to be deeply embedded in our intuitions about free choice
and action. We naturally assume, for example, that freedom and responsibility would
be deficient if it were always the case that we could only do otherwise by accident
or mistake, unintentionally, involuntarily, or irrationally. It is true that libertarian
free will requires that more than one branching pathway (history) into the future be
“open” to agents in the manner described in FF (p. 136). But it also requires some-
thing about the way that agents select from among these open pathways: Whichever
ones they select, if they are to do so “of their own free will,” they must do so voluntar-
ily, intentionally and rationally (at will, as we say), rather than merely accidentally,
unintentionally or irrationally.
4 Self-forming Actions (SFA’s)
We are now in a position to consider what further steps may be necessary to fully
address the Intelligibility Question.
The first important step is to note that, as the preceding discussion suggests, inde-
terminism need not be involved in all acts done “of our own free wills.” Often we
act from a will (character, motives and purposes) already formed. But it is “our own
free will” by virtue of the fact that we formed it to some degree by other choices or
actions in the past for which we could have done otherwise and which were unde-
termined. If this were not so there is nothing we could have ever done differently in
our entire lifetimes to make ourselves and our wills different than they are—a conse-
quence that I believe is incompatible with our being at least to some degree ultimately
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responsible for being the way we are, and for the wills we do have, and hence ulti-
mately responsible for the actions that flow from our wills. Compare Aristotle’s claim
that if a man is responsible for wicked acts that flow from his character and purposes
(his will) he must at some time in the past have been responsible for forming the
wicked character and purposes from which these acts flow.
I call those choices or actions in agents’ life histories by which they formed their
present wills and for which they could have done otherwise in a manner that was
undetermined, “self-forming actions” or SFAs. (They would be “deliberative stits”
in the language of FF.) I believe such self-forming actions occur at those difficult
times in life when we are torn between competing visions of what we should do or
become; and they are more frequent in everyday life than we may think. We might
be torn between doing the moral thing or acting from ambition, or between power-
ful present desires and long term goals, or faced with difficult tasks for which we
have aversions, etc. The uncertainty and inner tension we feel at such soul-searching
moments of self-formation, I suggest, would be reflected in some indeterminacy in
our neural processes themselves (perhaps chaotically amplified background neural
noise) “stirred up,” one might say, by the conflicts in our wills. What is experienced
personally as uncertainty at such moments would thus correspond physically to the
opening of a window of opportunity that temporarily screens off complete deter-
mination by influences of the past. (By contrast, when we act from predominant
motives and a “settled” will without such inner conflict, the indeterminacy is muted
or damped and plays a less significant role.)
In such cases of self-formation, we are faced with competing motivations and
whichever choice is made will require an effort of will to overcome the temptation
to make the other choice. I thus postulate that, in such cases, multiple goal-directed
cognitive processes would be involved in the brain, corresponding to competing
efforts, each with a different goal, corresponding to the competing choices that might
be made. In short, one might appeal to a form of parallel processing in the free
decision-making brain. One of these neural processes has as its goal, the making of
one of the competing choices (say, a moral choice), realized by reaching a certain
activation threshold, while the other has as its goal the making of the other choice (e.g.,
a self-interested choice). Likewise, the competing processes have different inputs,
moral motives (beliefs, desires, etc.), on the one hand, self-interested motives, on the
other. And each of the processes is the realizer of the agent’s effort or endeavoring to
bring about that particular choice (e.g. the moral choice) for those motives (e.g. moral
motives), thus taking the input into the corresponding output; and the processes are
so connected that if one should succeed, the other will shut down.
Because of the indeterminacy in each of these neural processes stirred up by the
conflict in the will, however, for each, it is not certain that it will succeed in reaching
its goal, i.e., an activation threshold that amounts to choice. Yet (and here is a further
crucial step) if either process does succeed in reaching its goal (the choice aimed at),
despite the indeterminacy involved, one can say that that choice was brought about
by the agent’s effort or endeavoring to bring about that choice for those motives,
because the process itself was the neural realizer of this effort and it succeeded in
reaching its goal, despite the indeterminism involved.
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Note that, in these circumstances, the choices either way would not be “inadver-
tent,” “accidental,” “capricious,” or “merely random,” because whichever choice is
made will be brought about by the agent’s effort to make that particular choice for
the reasons motivating that choice, reasons the agent will then and there endorse
by making the choice itself. Indeed, the agents will have plural voluntary control
(PVC) over the choices made, as defined earlier, since whichever choice is made will
be made voluntarily (i.e. in accordance with the agent’s will, because the prior will
is divided and the agent may consequently choose either way at will), intentionally
(i.e. on purpose rather than accidentally or inadvertently, since the choice will result
from the goal-directed effort to make that choice) and rationally (i.e. because the
choice will be made for reasons motivating that choice which are reasons the agent
has, and decides to act on then and there).
The idea in sum is to think of the indeterminism involved in free choice, not as
a cause acting on its own, but as an ingredient in larger goal-directed or teleologi-
cal activities of the agent, in which the indeterminism functions as a hindrance or
interfering element in the attainment of the goal. The choices that result are then
achievements brought about by the goal-directed activity (the effort) of the agent,
which might have failed since they were undetermined, but one of which succeeds.
Moreover, if there are multiple such processes aiming at different goals (as in the
conflicted circumstances of an SFA), whichever choice may be made, will have been
brought about by the agent’s effort to bring about that particular choice rather than
some other, despite the possibility of failure due to the indeterminism.
In such circumstances, as a consequence, the indeterminism, though causally rel-
evant to the choice, would not be the cause of the choice because it would have been
an interfering element lowering the probability that that choice would be made from
what it would have been if there was no interference. The causes of the choice, by
contrast, would be those relevant factors that significantly raised the probability that
this choice would be made rather than some other, such as the agent’s motives for
making this choice rather than the other and the agent’s deliberative efforts to over-
come the temptations to make the contrary choice. Were these factors not present
there would be no chance this choice would be made because there would be no
cognitive process of the agent aiming at it. Moreover, if the choice was caused by a
deliberative cognitive process of the agent aiming at it, it would also be true to say
that the agent caused the choice.
A further point is that when indeterminism thus functions as an obstacle to the
success of a goal-directed activity of an agent, which succeeds in attaining its goal
nonetheless, the indeterminism does not preclude responsibility. There are many
examples demonstrating this fact (some first suggested by J. L. Austin and Elizabeth
Anscombe). Here is one I have previously used. A husband, while arguing with his
wife, in anger swings his arm down on her favorite glass-table top in an effort to
break it. Imagine that there is some indeterminism in the nerves of his arm making
the momentum of his swing indeterminate so that it is literally undetermined whether
the table will break right up to the moment when it is struck. Whether the husband
breaks the table or not is undetermined; and yet he is clearly responsible if he does
break it, because the breaking was caused by his effort to break it by swinging his
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arm down forcefully on it. That is why it would be a poor excuse for him to say to
his wife “Chance did it (broke the table), not me.” Even though chance was causally
relevant, because there was chance he would fail, chance didn’t do it, he did.
But isn’t it the case, one might ask, that whether one of these neural processes
succeeds (say, in choosing A) rather than the competing process (in choosing B)
(i) depends on whether certain neurons involved in the processing fire or do not
fire (perhaps within a certain time frame); and isn’t it the case that (ii) whether or
not these neurons fire is undetermined and hence a matter of chance and hence that
(iii) the agent does not have control over whether or not they fire? But if these claims
are true, it seems to follow that the choice merely “happened” as a result of these
chance firings and so (iv) the agent did not make the choice of A rather than B and
(v) hence was not responsible for making it. As a consequence, it looks like the
outcome must be merely a matter of chance or luck and not a responsible choice
after all.
But those who reason this way do so too hastily. For the surprising thing is that,
even if (i)–(iii) are true, (iv) and (v) do not follow when the following conditions also
hold: (a) the choosing of A rather than B (or B rather than A, whichever occurs) was
something the agent was endeavoring or trying to bring about, (b) the indeterminism
in the neuron firings was a hindrance or obstacle to the achievement of that goal
and (c) the agent nonetheless succeeded in achieving the goal despite the hindering
effects of the indeterminism.
For, consider the husband swinging his arm down on the table. It is also true in
his case that (i) whether or not his endeavoring or trying to break the table succeeds
“depends” on whether certain neurons in his arm fire or do not fire; and it is also
true in his case that (ii) whether these neurons fire or not is undetermined and hence
a matter of chance and hence (iii) their firing or not, is not under his control. Yet,
even though we can say all this, it does not follow that (iv) the husband did not break
the table and that (v) he is not responsible for breaking the table, if his endeavoring
or trying to do so succeeds. Surprising indeed! But this is the kind of significant
result one gets when indeterminism or chance plays an interfering or hindering role
in larger goal-directed activities of agents that may succeed or fail.
It is well to reflect on this: We tend to reason that if an action (whether an overt
action of breaking a table or a mental action of making a choice) depends on whether
certain neurons fire or not (in the arm or in the brain), then the agent must be able
to make those neurons fire or not, if the agent is to be responsible for the action. In
other words, we think we have to crawl down to the place where the indeterminism
originates (in the individual neurons) and make them go one way or the other. We
think we have to become originators at the micro-level and “tip the balance” that
chance leaves untipped, if we (and not chance) are to be responsible for the outcome.
And we realize, of course, that we can’t do that. But we don’t have to. It is the wrong
place to look. We don’t have to micro-manage our individual neurons to perform
purposive actions and we do not have such micro-control over our neurons even
when we perform ordinary actions such as swinging an arm down on a table.
What we need when we perform purposive activities, mental or physical, is
macro-control of processes involving many neurons—processes that may succeed in
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achieving their goals despite indeterminacies that may be involved in “the naturally
noisy processes of sensory transduction.” We do not micro-manage our actions by
controlling each individual neuron or muscle that might be involved. But that does not
prevent us from macro-managing our purposive activities (whether they be mental
activities such as practical reasoning, or physical activities, such as arm-swingings)
and being responsible when those purposive activities attain their goals, despite the
indeterminacies involved. And this would be true in self-forming choices or SFAs,
as conceived above, whichever of the competing purposive activities succeeds.
5 Further Issues: Efforts, Introspection, Agency, Control,
Rationality
Needless to say, there are many further potential objections to the preceding view
that need to be addressed, as with any view, and which I have tried to address in
many of my writings. In this concluding section I can only briefly respond to a few
of these additional objections and refer readers to other writings for discussion of
others.1
A commonly-made further objection is that it is irrational to make efforts to do
incompatible things. I concede that in most ordinary situations it is. But I contend that
there are special circumstances in which it is not irrational to make competing efforts:
These include circumstances in which (i) we are deliberating between competing
options; (ii) we intend to choose one or the other, but cannot choose both; (iii) we
have powerful motives for wanting to choose each of the options for different and
competing reasons; (iv) there is a consequent resistance in our will to either choice, so
that (v) if either choice is to have a chance of being made, effort will have to be made
to overcome the temptation to make the other choice; and most importantly, (vi) we
want to give each choice a fighting chance of being made because the motives for
each choice are important to us. The motives for each choice define in part what sort
of person we are; and we would taking them lightly if we did not make an effort in
their behalf. And, as it turns out, these are precisely the conditions of “self-forming”
actions or SFAs (see e.g., Kane 1996, 128–143, 2002b, 417–124).
It is important to note in this connection that our normal intuitions about efforts
are formed in everyday situations in which our will is already “settled” on doing
something, where obstacles and resistance have to be overcome if we are to succeed
in doing it. We want to open a drawer, which is jammed, so we have to make an
effort to pull it open. In such everyday situations, it would be irrational to make
incompatible efforts because our wills are already settled on doing what we are
trying or endeavoring to do. But situations of the above kinds involving SFAs are
what I call will-setting rather than will-settled. They are situations in which one’s
will is not yet set on doing either of the things one is trying to do, but where one has
strong reasons for doing each (e.g., deciding to A and deciding to B), and neither set
1 Kane (1985, 1989, 1996, 1999a, b, 2000, 2002a, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2011), Kane (2007).
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of reasons is as yet decisive. Because most efforts in everyday life are made in will-
settled situations, we tend to assimilate all effort-making to such situations, thereby
failing to consider the uniqueness of will-setting, which is of a piece, in my view,
with the uniqueness of free will.
Another commonly-made objection is that we are not introspectively or con-
sciously aware of making dual efforts and performing multiple cognitive tasks in
self-forming choice situations. But I am not claiming that agents are introspectively
aware of making dual efforts. What persons are introspectively aware of in SFA situ-
ations is that they are trying to decide about which of two (or more) options to choose
and that either choice is a difficult one because there are resistant motives pulling
them in different directions that will have to be overcome, whichever choice is made.
In such introspective conditions, I am theorizing that what is going on underneath
is a kind of distributed processing in the brain that involves separate attempts or
endeavorings to resolve competing cognitive tasks.
There is a larger point here that I have often emphasized: Introspective evidence
cannot give us the whole story about free will. Stay on the introspective surface
and libertarian free will is likely to appear obscure or mysterious, as it so often has
in history. What is needed is a theory about what might be going on underneath
when we exercise such a free will, not merely a description of what we immediately
experience. In this regard, it is my view that new scientific ideas can be a help rather
than a hindrance to making sense of free will.
It is now widely believed, for example, that parallel processing takes place in
the brain in such cognitive phenomena as visual perception. The theory is that the
brain separately processes different features of the visual scene, such as object and
background, through distributed and parallel, though interacting, neural pathways
or streams.2 Suppose someone objected that we are not introspectively aware of
such distributed processing in ordinary cases of perception. That would hardly be a
decisive objection against this new theory of vision. For the claim is that this is what
we are doing in visual perception, not necessarily that we are introspectively aware
of doing it. And I am making a similar claim about free will. If parallel distributed
processing takes place on the input side of the cognitive ledger (in perception), then
why not consider that it also takes place on the output side (in practical reasoning,
choice and action)? That is what I am suggesting we should suppose if we are to
make sense of libertarian free will.
Another set of objections involves issues about control. Doesn’t indeterminism at
least diminish the control agents exercise over their self-forming choices or SFA’s?
Indeterminism does diminish a certain kind of control that agents may exercise over
their self-forming choices, which I have called antecedent determining control, the
power to guarantee or determine in advance that some event will occur. Clearly
agents cannot have such control over SFAs (which are deliberative stits) and which
must be undetermined at all times before they occur. But from the fact that one does
not control which of a set of outcomes is going to occur before it occurs, it does not
2 For an overview of research supporting such views about parallel distributed processing in vision
see Bechtel (2001).
172 R. Kane
follow that one does not control which of them occurs when it occurs (Kane 1996,
133–148, 1999a). When the conditions for SFAs are satisfied, agents exercise control
over their future lives then and there by deciding. Indeed, as argued earlier, they have
what I have called “plural voluntary control” over their options in the sense that they
are able at the moment of choice to bring about whichever of the options they will,
when they will to do so, for the reasons they will to do so, and on purpose rather than
by mistake or accident.
And note that it is the diminishment of antecedent determining control over any
one of the options that makes possible such plural voluntary control over each of
them. Indeterminism, by being a hindrance to the realization of some of the agent’s
purposes, opens up the possibility of pursuing other purposes, of doing otherwise, vol-
untarily and rationally. To be genuinely self-forming agents (creators of ourselves),
to have a free will, there must at times in life be such obstacles and hindrances in
our wills that must be overcome. Self-formation, as I like to say, is not a gift, but a
struggle.
One further remark about control: For an agent to have control generally at a time t
over the being or not being (existence or non-existence) of some event (e.g. a choice)
is for the agent to have the ability or power at the time t to make that event be at t and
the ability or power to make it not be at t. And in an SFA, one exercises just such
control over the choice one makes (e.g. the choice of A rather than B) at the time one
makes it. For, one not only has the ability or power at that time to make that choice
be, one also has the ability or power at that time to make it not be, by making the
competing choice (of B rather than A) be. One has both these powers because either
of the efforts or endeavorings in which one is engaged might succeed in attaining
its goal (choosing A or choosing B) at the time. And if either effort does succeed
in attaining its goal, the agent can be said to have brought about the choice thereby
made by making that effort to bring it about.
A final objection I will consider here is this: Is there not some truth to the oft-
repeated charge that undetermined choices of the kinds required by libertarian free
will must be arbitrary in a certain sense? A residual arbitrariness seems to remain in
all self-forming choices or SFAs since the agents cannot in principle have sufficient
or overriding (“conclusive” or “decisive”) prior reasons for making one option and
one set of reasons prevail over the other.
I think there is some truth to this charge, but it is a truth that reveals something
important about free will. I have argued elsewhere (Kane 1996, 145–146) that such
arbitariness relative to prior reasons tells us that every undetermined self-forming
choice or SFA is the creation of novel constraints upon an agent’s pathway into the
future, constraints that are not fully explained or determined by the agent’s past,
but are consistent with that past. In making such a choice we say, in effect, “I am
opting that these purposes and plans (rather than some others) will be a part of my
pathway into the future, my future life. Doing so is not required by my past reasons,
but is consistent with my past and represents one branching pathway my life can now
meaningfully take. Whether it is the right choice, only time will tell. Meanwhile, I
am willing to take responsibility for it one way or the other.”
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Of special interest here, as I have often noted, is that the term “arbitrary” comes
from the Latin arbitrium, which means “judgment”—as in liberum arbitrium vol-
untatis, “free judgment of the will,” which is the medieval designation for free will.
Imagine a writer in the middle of a novel. The novel’s heroine faces a crisis and the
writer has not yet developed her character in sufficient detail to say exactly how she
will act. The author makes a “judgment” about this that is not determined by the
heroine’s already formed past which does not give unique direction. In this sense,
the judgment (arbitrium) of how she will react is “arbitrary,” but not entirely so. It
had input from the heroine’s fictional past and in turn gave input to her projected
future.
In a similar way, agents who exercise free will are both authors of and characters in
their own stories at once. By virtue of “self-forming” judgments of the will (arbitria
voluntatis) (SFAs), they are “arbiters” of their own lives, “making themselves” out
of past that, if they are truly free, does not limit their future pathways to one. If
we should charge them with not having sufficient or conclusive prior reasons for
choosing as they did, they might reply: “True enough. But I did have good reasons
for choosing as I did, which I’m willing to endorse and take responsibility for. If
they were not sufficient or conclusive reasons, that’s because, like the heroine of
the novel, I was not a fully formed person before I chose (and still am not, for that
matter). Like the author of the novel, I am in the process of writing an unfinished
story and forming an unfinished character who, in my case, is myself.”
In the logical framework of Belnap et al. Facing the Future, these libera arbitria
voluntatis or self-forming choices (SFAs) would be deliberative stits, or delibera-
tive seeings to it that, of agents. They are represented at moments in the logic of
branching time at which there are multiple possible branching future histories; and
they determine a particular class of possible future histories within which the future
life of the agent must lie. Such self-forming actions or SFA’s are not the only kinds
of actions that agents can perform “of their own free wills,” however, on the above
account. As noted earlier, often we act from a will already formed, but it is “our
own free will” (a will “of our own free making”) to the degree that we formed it by
earlier SFAs that were undetermined, and for which we could have done otherwise
voluntarily, intentionally and rationally.
Those acts that flow determinately from a will already formed in this manner could
be counted as achievement stits in the framework of Facing the Future. And they too
could be acts done “of our own free wills” to the degree that the wills from which
they determinately flow were formed by earlier SFAs. For example, on my way to
a class this afternoon on campus, I look up at the clock on the University tower
and notice that it is five minutes before the start of the class. Without deliberating
about it, I immediately hasten my pace in order to make the class on time. I did not
make an explicit choice or decision to hasten my pace at that moment. My doing
so was rather guaranteed once I noticed the time (in the manner of an achievement
stit) by a prior choice (an SFA) made the day before, when I resolved not to be
late for any more classes this semester. I thus hastened my pace “of my own free
will” in the sense of a will freely formed in part by a prior self-forming choice
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(a deliberative stit) that was undetermined and such that I could have done otherwise
when I made it.
In such ways, and in many others, the logical framework pioneered by Nuel Belnap
and spelled out by him and his co-authors in Facing the Future provides, in my view,
just the right kind of logical framework required to give an account of a traditional
(libertarian) free will requiring indeterminism and thereby to answer what I have
called the Intelligibility Question.
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